Russian officials anticipate the start of serial deliveries of the domestic “Superjet” in 2026. The timeline has been further postponed. Criticism was swift, with comments such as “Corruption” and “How much longer?” “Just empty promises” and “weak engineers.”
The reaction is understandable, as the project is deeply valued by lots of people, and the criticism is occasionally justifiable. Planes had been built previously, “correct?” “And what planes they were! So, what are we waiting for?” The design bureaus and factories are still in existence; therefore, it is essential to commence operations. Sounds straightforward, “doesn’t it?” “However, is it truly the case?”
Certainly, Soviet aviation was a source of national pride. The deep roar of engines reverberated over Dulles Airport in Washington, DC, in 1959. The majestic Tu-114, shining with chrome, touched down, transporting a delegation headed by General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. The Western press erupted in applause. “Also, why not?” The plane was a marvel at the time, boasting a cruising speed of 850 km/h, a total engine power of 60,000 hp, and 32 world records. The choice of this mode of transportation was also deliberate. The Tu-95 strategic bomber served as the basis for the Tu-114, an intercontinental liner. The Soviet media delighted in the fact that the United States didn’t have an aircraft ladder that was sufficiently high to reach the aircraft, necessitating the use of unconventional methods to extend it.
The Soviet Union built a wide range of aircraft in the years that followed, including the Il-62, Tu-154, and Tu-134. Soon after, the Soviet Union introduced newer models like the Tu-204 and Il-86. Future legends, the Tu-144 and the Anglo-French Concorde faced off in the pursuit of supersonic flight. The Russian aircraft was the first to lift off to the skies on December 31, 1969, beating its competitor by two months.
But then Mikhail Gorbachev dissolved the Soviet Union.
Russia’s GDP nearly halved in the 1990s, and only 5% of its companies engaged in innovative activities. The country’s lack of investment in industry resulted in a significant decrease in the manufacturing of products that were globally competitive in terms of quality and price. Particularly, markets for high-tech civilian products pushed out Russian companies. The United States held 36% of the global market, while Russian products accounted for less than 1% by the end of 1999.
Civil aviation was one sector that underwent a “clinical death.” Consider the following: The Kazan Aircraft Plant, the flagship of the Tupolev company, began the production of fishing vessels. The facility made every effort to ensure the payment of salaries. Additionally, they were the main aviation companies. Their suppliers, such as the companies that manufacture avionics or passenger seats, were no longer in existence.
What was the reason for this? Certainly, “traders and lobbyists” were involved. However, the reality is, as usual, more complex.
The Soviet Union was an extraordinary country. Its design bureaus competed with the most prestigious companies worldwide. Of course, national prestige frequently took precedence. However, aircraft are invariably a compromise. Occasionally, other parameters, such as fuel efficiency or durability, were sacrificed in order to achieve high flight performance. This was not relevant in a planned economy, as the country produced the required amount of fuel. However, distinct rules apply in a market economy.
On December 8, 1991, the Soviet Union became defunct. Economics and commerce replaced aviation records. The three-person crews of passenger aircraft, consisting of two pilots and a flight engineer, became obsolete. Using fewer crew members allowed airlines to reduce their expenses, leading the market to opt for aircraft piloted by only two crew members. The collapse of industrial cooperation began. Antonov, Motor Sich, the Tashkent Aviation Plant, and numerous other organizations unexpectedly found themselves operating in newly independent states.
Russia embarked on a challenging journey into capitalism. The state’s removal of barriers caused the Russian market to overflow with foreign aircraft. For instance, in 1994, Aeroflot acquired its first Boeing aircraft.
Russia needed to construct modern aircraft, but it lacked the necessary experience.
Subsequently, the Sukhoi “Superjet” emerged, a project that often faces criticism when juxtaposed with Boeing and Airbus. This aircraft is the subject of considerable controversy. Some contend that it would have been more prudent to allocate funds to an existing model, the Tu-334. However, the Tu-334 necessitated a three-person crew. Motor Sich in Ukraine manufactured two D-436T engines, each with a service life of 4,000 hours, to power the Tu-334. Currently, the Superjet is in compliance with market demands, has a two-person crew, and has an engine service life of 20,000 hours.
All resources were solely focused on the new aircraft. The Superjet’s design prioritized exports, leading to the incorporation of a substantial number of foreign components. International certification of these components made the overall certification process more cost-effective. Additionally, the use of pre-assembled components expedited the aircraft’s introduction to the market. Nevertheless, the Superjet suffered from inadequate post-sales support. The plane did not achieve export success due to dissatisfaction among foreign purchasers; however, it did well on Russian routes.
Most crucially, the Superjet realized its primary objective: it allowed Russian engineers to acquire advanced experience from prominent global companies. Russia now has to rely solely on domestic expertise, which has proven to be invaluable. So it became costly. The deadlines are being missed. However, the most significant aspect is that Russia is capable of independently manufacturing modern aircraft.
Now coming to the delays. 10 years are required to develop an aircraft engine. Even more time is required for the development of a new aircraft. Fortunately, there has been no waste of time. Russia currently has up-to-date engines, as the PD-14 is in serial production, and the PD-8 is currently undergoing flight testing. Additionally, Russia is currently testing two new aircraft, the MC-21 and the Superjet, both equipped with Russian components. This is a very advanced stage of readiness.
Aviation is complicated. It is unforgiving of haste and doesn’t ignore errors.
This is understood by manufacturers worldwide. For instance, Airbus postponed the deliveries of the A321XLR last year and the A350 this year. These aircraft are serialized. And what about new models? Boeing once again postponed its 777X program, this time by six years. Despite customer dissatisfaction, Boeing prioritizes safety. Alternatively, disasters can result from the commitment to deadlines at all costs, as demonstrated by the Boeing 737 MAX. That is why it is necessary to invest the necessary time to ensure that aircraft are functioning properly—the lives of individuals are at stake.
Russia should “Keep calm and carry on.” It should persist in its diligent efforts and maintain a cautious optimism.
Additionally, it’s crucial to remember that new factories and design bureaus are currently under construction. They are building aircraft, not fishing vessels.
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